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THE PROBLEM OF RISK IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
MARK A. SUMMERS"
I. INTRODUCTION

Calibrating individual responsibility for group criminality is one of the
most difficult challenges international criminal law faces. Beginning at
Nuremberg and continuing with the ad hoc tribunals, courts have struggled
with this issue. 1 International crimes are, by definition, large-scale
operations involving hundreds, even thousands, of participants. 2 Because
the mission of international criminal law is to punish "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community," 3 its targets are
defendants who occupy civilian or military leadership positions while the
crimes they are prosecuted for are committed by individuals loosely
connected to the leaders on battlefields miles away. 4 The leaders, who set
in motion a campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide, are obviously more
culpable than those who implement the plan. But should the leaders be
held responsible for all the crimes committed by their subordinates, even if
those crimes were not part of the original plan?
One solution could be enterprise liability; that is, defendants are liable
because of their membership in the group and not for crimes committed by
others in the group that are attributed to them. This solution was attempted
at Nuremberg based on a United States proposal that the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) would "try the criminality of the organizations
themselves" and individual defendants would then be convicted based on
their membership in those organizations. 5 The IMT partially rejected this

* Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law; B.A., Washington
and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M, Cambridge University (International
Law). I would like to thank the Barry University School of Law for its support in the writing of this
Article.
I. Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law, 12
CHI.J.INT'L L. 159, 160 (2011).
2. id. at 161.
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. Jain, supra note 1, at 161-62.
5. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 75, 113 (2005) [hereinafter Danner & Martinez]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, Annex to the London Agreement, art. 10, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter]:
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solution by placing the burden on the prosecution to prove that a defendant
6
voluntarily and knowingly participated in the group's criminal activities.
Since Nuremberg, no international criminal court has accepted group
membership alone as a basis for individual criminal liability. 7
While enterprise liability was not accepted in international criminal
law, conspiracy, as a way of attributing liability for crimes committed by
members of a criminal group, was. 8 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter9
provided that defendants who participated in the common plan or
conspiracy were responsible "for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan." This was the seed from which the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia's (ICTY) doctrine of joint criminal
•
enterpnse
grew. IO
In 1993, the U.N. Security Council created the ICTY to prosecute
crimes that occurred during the war in Yugoslavia. 11 A year later, the
Security Council established another ad hoc tribunal, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to prosecute the crimes that
occurred during the genocide in Rwanda. 12 Although these tribunals had
jurisdiction over crimes, which by their very nature are usually
collective, 13 their governing statutes seemingly ignored this fact in the
prov1s10ns dealing with individual criminal responsibility. Those
provisions stipulated that "a person who planned, instigated, ordered, [or]

In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent
national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts.
6. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5 at 115; see also Saira Mohamed, Remarks by Saira
Mohamed, 105 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L PROC. 321 (Mar. 23-26 2011) (observing that the IMT "certainly
placed significant limitations on the reach of conspiracy liability and the criminal organizations
doctrine").
7. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5 at 109.
8. Id. at 116.
9. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6 provides:
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
Id. (emphasis added).
I 0. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
11. Id.
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
13. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 (War crimes are "committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes") and art. 7 (Crimes against humanity are
"part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population"); see also Jain,
supra note I ("An international crime such as genocide typically involves widespread participation by
a very large number of people .... ").
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committed" a crime was individually responsible without mentioning
attribution of criminal liability for crimes committed by others who were
members of a group to which the defendant belonged. 14 They contained no
analog to Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter or any other type of
associational liability, except aiding and abetting another person in the
planning, preparation, or execution of a crime. 15 But because aiders and
abettors need only know that they are providing assistance to the principal
perpetrator of the crime, they are viewed as having a "lower level of
criminal culpability," 16 which would inadequately reflect the guilt of those
in leadership positions. 17
Not surprisingly, then, the ICTY faced the issue of how to attribute
liability for crimes among the members of a group in its first case. 18 The
Tadic court solved the problem by finding that a defendant, who was part
of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE), was liable for crimes committed by
other members of the group. 19 The Tadic Appeals Chamber discovered
three forms of JCE liability-ICE I (basic/shared intent); JCE II
(systemic/prison camp); and JCE III (extended/other foreseeable
crimes)2°-which it said were grounded in customary international law? 1
Because it makes members of a JCE III liable for crimes that· are
outside the criminal purpose of the enterprise so long as those crimes are
"foreseeable,"22 the Tadic Court's conclusion that the extended form of
liability (JCE III) is customary law has been vigorously challenged by

14. ICTY Statute, supra note IO, art. 7(1); ICTR Statue, supra note 12, art. 6(1). The statutes of
other post-Nuremberg ad hoc tribunals are identical in this respect to those of the ICTY and ICTR: See
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 13, 2000),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkCiick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd I MJeEw°/o3D&; Law on. the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, art. 29, 27(NS/RKM/1004/006) (Oct. 27, 2004),
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/KR_Law_as _amended_27_
Oct_ 2004_Eng.pdf.
15. Significantly, none of these statutes provided for attribution of liability by conspiracy as the
Nuremberg Charter did. See supra text accompanying note 9; See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note I 0,
art. 7(1 ).
16. Gunel Guliyeva, The Concept ofJoint Criminal Enterprise and ICC Jurisdiction, 5 EYES ON
THE ICC 49, 51 (2008-2009) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment
(Int'!. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal Judgment].
17. Id. (There are "situations where the weight of other participants' contributions is no less than
that of physical perpetrators and where the previously mentioned modes of participation do not fairly
reflect 'the moral gravity' of such contributions.") (quoting Appeals Tadic Appeal Judgment).
18. Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 17.
I 9. Id. ilil 226-28.
20. Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 52. The criteria for liability under the three forms of JCE will be
discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra.
2 I. Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 17, iii! 226-28.
22. Id. ii 204 passim.
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scholars. 23 Also, it has been argued that there is no basis for JCE III
24
liability in the statutes of the international criminal tribunals. Despite
25
these criticisms and many others, JCE I and II, as well as JCE III, have
been "adopted without modification by most subsequent cases." 26
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 27 unlike
the ICTY and ICTR statutes, has two provisions dealing with group
criminality. Article 25(3)(a) provides that a person who "[ c ]ommits ... a
crime [within the jurisdiction of the Court] whether as an individual, [or]
jointly with another or through another person ... is criminally
responsible."28 Article 25(d) makes a person criminally liable who "[i]n
any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose." 29
Joint liability in Article 25(3)(a) reflects the concept of co-perpetration,30
while Article 25(d) resembles a form of aiding and abetting collective
criminality. 31
Like JCE I, Article 25(a) makes a co-perpetrator liable for crimes that
are expressly part of a plan formulated by a group of which he was a
member even though he did not perform every act necessary to complete
the crimes. 32 Since the Rome Statute was elaborated, however, it has been
the subject of intense scholarly debate whether Article 25(a)(3) attributes
liability for so-called "deviant" crimes, i.e., those that are not part of the
plan but are nonetheless foreseeable consequences of it. 33

23. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693,
709, 711-12 (2010-2011) (questioning whether prior to Tadic "there was a single case applying
international criminal law or the international law of war that held a defendant vicariously responsible
for the foreseeable actions of other members of a common criminal enterprise that nonetheless fell
outside the scope of the criminal plan"); Id. at 712 (concluding that "there remains no non-questionbegging rationale for JCE III in customary international law"); George P. Fletcher& Jens David Ohlin,
Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539,
548 (2005) ("The history of the doctrine [JCE] is one of judicial creativity.").
24. Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J.INT'L CRIM. JUST.
159, 173 (2007) ("JCE II and Ill constitute new and autonomous (systemic) concepts of imputation
without an explicit basis in written international criminal law."). Art. 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
contradicts this conclusion. In fact, it goes even further than JCE Ill by imposing liability for "all
acts," not just foreseeable ones. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5.
25. The criticisms of JCE are catalogued in Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 59--65.
26. Ambos, supra note 24, at 171.
27. Rome Statute, supra note 3.
28. Id. art. 25(3)(a).
29. Id. art. 25(3)(d).
30. Jain, supra note I, at 182-83; Ambos, supra note 24 at 170-71.
31. Ambos, supra note 24, at 172.
32. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
33. Compare, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 212 (2d ed. 2008)
(finding that all three types of JCE are included in Article 25(3)(a)), with Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note
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The search for an answer to the question whether the Rome Statute
includes a form of such liability depends upon another of its provisions,
Article 30, which states that "[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall
be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with
intent and knowledge." 34 In the first case decided by an ICC Trial
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 35 the court explicitly rejected the earlier
holding of a Pre-Trial Chamber36 when it decided that liability based on
some form of recklessness or do/us eventualis (JCE III) 37 was
"deliberately excluded" from Article 30. 38
Despite the Lubanga Trial Chamber's rejection of recklessness and its
civil law cousin, do/us eventualis, as mental states which could support a
conviction for a violation of international criminal law, some theory of
liability for conduct where the mental state of the perpetrator is less than
intentional or knowing is essential if the ICC is to carry out its mandate to
"put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes."39 Moreover,
since risk-taking is an essential feature of recklessness, 40 the Lubanga
Trial Chamber opened the door to such an approach when it held that. the
implementation of the co-perpetrators' common plan must "[embody] a
sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be
committed. " 41
There is, however, a lack of clarity in international criminal law
regarding the standard that should be applied in attributing liability for
risky conduct. 42 An approach that is too lax can result in overly expansive
liability that exceeds culpability. 43 An approach that is too restrictive can
produce impunity for conduct that is worthy of punishment. 44 This Article

23, at 548 (arguing that Article 25(3)(a) "effectively replaced" JCE as it was applied by the JCTY),

and Ambos, supra note 24, at 171-72 (asserting that JCE I is a form of co-perpetration within the
meaning of Article 25(3)(a) but JCE II and Ill are not).
34. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1 ).
35. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. JCC-01/04-01/06-248, Judgment (Mar. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter Lubanga Judgment].
36. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges
(Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Lubanga PTC Decision].
3 7. See Johan D. van der Vyver, infra note 138, at 243-44.
38. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 35, atif 1011.
39. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Preamble.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE, cmt. § 2.02 (1985).
41. Lubanga Judgment at if 984.
42. See, e.g., infra pp. 685-86.
43. Ronald C. Slye & Beth Van Schaack, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: The ESSENTIALS
293 (2009).
44. Id.
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will explore the causes of this lack of clarity beginning with the Tadic case
and the post-Tadic decisions of the ICTY. Then it will analyze the nascent
case law of the ICC to see how the Court has dealt with this problem so
far. Finally, this Article will suggest a solution, based on the Model Penal
Code approach to recklessness, which strikes the proper balance between
over attribution and under punishment.
II. TADIC AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY BASED ON RECKLESSNESS
In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY faced a dilemma. Tadic

had been acquitted by the Trial Chamber of the most serious crimes with
which he was charged, the murders of five individuals from the village of
JaskiCi. 45 His participation in those crimes did not amount to direct
perpetration,46 nor was he liable under the theory of superior
responsibility. 47 Without another theory of individual responsibility, 48 the
Trial Chamber's decision would have to stand. Consequently, the Appeals
Chamber searched for and found what it deemed to be a theory of
customary international law49 that justified Tadic's conviction. The theory
was "common purpose" liability, 50 which the Tadic court said
"encompasses three distinct categories of collective criminality," 51 which
have come to be known as Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) I, II and III. 52

45. Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 172.
46. Direct perpetration is planning, instigating, ordering or committing. ICTY Statute, supra note
10, art. 7(1). For an analysis of the evidence against Tadic, see infra p. 676.
47. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(3).
48. Tadic could have been held liable as an aider and abettor under ICTY Statute, art. 7(1 ), but to
have done so would have "understate[d] the degree of [his] criminal responsibility." Tadic Appeal
Judgment at iJ 192.
49. Tadic Appeal Judgment iliJ 194-95.
50. Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 195.
51. Id.
52. Commentators have criticized the Tadic Appeals Chambers' conclusion that the third
category of JCE (JCE 111) is customary international law. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 5,
at 110 ("The cases cited in Tadic ... do not support the sprawling form of JCE, particularly the
extended form of this kind ofliability, currently employed at the ICTY."); Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae
Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors' Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav
"Duch" dated 8 August 2008, 20 Criminal Law Forum 353, 385-86 (2009), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/1046-8374/20/2-3/. More recently, one of the ad hoc post-ICTY
tribunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, held that JCE 111 was not customary
international law in 1975-1979, the time period relevant to Case 002. Prosecutor v. Ieng et al.,
Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE), iii! 77-78, and 87, Case No. 002-19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38) (May
20, 2010), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/097_15 _9 _
EN.pdf.
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While this Article focuses principally on JCE III, a brief description of
all three forms is appropriate.

A. JCEI
The most basic, and least controversial, form of JCE liability is the
common enterprise/shared common intention category (JCE 1). 53 The
Tadic Appeals Chamber described JCE I as,
... all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common design possess
the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan
among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common
design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role
with it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill. ... 54
Unfortunately, this form of JCE could not support a finding that Tadic had
participated in the murders. While the evidence proved that he "actively
took part in the common criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the
non-Serb population," and that it was "beyond doubt" that he was "aware
of the killings accompanying the commission of inhumane acts against the
non-Serb population,"55 evidence of awareness (knowledge) was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic shared the
intention to kill the victims.

B. JCEII
The second category of JCE liability-the "systemic form" 56-is not
relevant to the facts in Tadic. 57 This form of liability is derived from the
concentration camp cases where, in order to establish the liability of the
camp commander, or others higher up the chain of command, the
prosecution must prove:
(i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat detainees and
commit the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused's awareness of
the nature of the system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some
way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e., encouraged,

53.
54.
55.
56.
JCE).
57.

See Ambos, supra note 24, at 160.
Tadic Appeal Judgment iJ I 96.
Id. iJ 231.
Id. iii! 202-03; Ambos, supra note 24, at 160 (describing JCE II as the "systemic form" of
Tadic Appeal Judgment iJ 203.
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aided and abetted or in any case participated in the realisation of the
common criminal design. 58
Based on these criteria, JCE II requires knowledge of the result (ill
treatment of prisoners) and some affirmative act of participation in the
enterprise. JCE II could not solve the problem the Tadic Appeals Chamber
faced because, most obviously, the crimes did not take place in a prison
camp setting. So the Tadic court had to look even further, venturing into
what some believe was entirely new territory, 59 where it found JCE III.
C. JCE Ill

The third category of JCE, the "so-called 'extended' joint enterprise,"60
exists where one of the co-actors commits a crime not within the scope of
the common plan but which constitutes a "natural and foreseeable
consequence" of the execution of the plan. 61 The Tadic Appeals Chamber
gave an example of JCE III that was eerily similar to the facts in Tadic
itself. It posited a hypothetical common plan to ethnically cleanse a village
during which one or more of the villagers were killed. 62 While killing
civilians was not part of the plan, "it was nevertheless foreseeable that the
forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of
one or more [of them]. "63
Here, unlike JCE I or JCE II, attribution of criminal liability for the
murders is cut loose from the mens rea requirements of intent to produce,
or even knowledge of, the result. Instead criminal attribution rests on the
more elastic concept of foreseeability. No wonder ICTY prosecutors have
used JCE as a theory of liability so frequently; 64 it relieves them to a
substantial degree of their burden of proof and exposes defendants to
punishment for the most serious offenses on proof arguably amounting to
little more than simple negligence. 65

58. Id. ii 202.
59. See supra note 52; see also Ambos, supra note 24, at 173.
60. Ambos, supra note 24, at 160.
61. Tadic Appeal Judgmentil 204.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. One study showed that from its genesis in Tadic until 2004, JCE was alleged in 64% of the
ICTY indictments. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5, at 107-08. If "acting in concert" is added as a
theory for attributing liability, the total rises to 81 %. Id.
65. Id. at 108--09.
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Tadic set out the elements that must be proven to establish membership
in a JCE III. 66 There are three actus reus elements that are the same for all
three categories of JCE: 67 (1) a plurality of persons; (2) a common plan,
design or purpose amounting to or involving the commission of a crime
within the ICTY statute; and (3) a participation element-the members of
the group must assist in or contribute to the execution of the plan. 68
The mens rea element, however, is different for JCE I and JCE III. For
ICE I, the mens rea is "the intent to perpetrate a certain crime" shared by
all the co-perpetrators. 69 By contrast, for JCE III, there must be "the
intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal
purpose of a group ... or in any event to the commission of a crime by the
group," 70 and for a defendant to be liable for a crime other than one
included in the group's plan, it must have been ''foreseeable that such a
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and ...
the accused willingly took that risk.'m
The post-Tadic cases did not interpret its holding consistently, leading
to substantial confusion, especially regarding the required level of risk
awareness 72 and the likelihood that the risk would materialize. 73 Since the
Tadic opinion itself is the basis for much of this confusion, it is there we
tum first in search of its understanding of risk.

66. JCE llI was not alleged in the indictment as a basis for the defendant's liability for the
murders in Jaskici. Id. at n.130.
67. Tadic Appeal Judgment iliJ 227-28.
68. Tadic Appeal Judgment if 227 iii.
69. Id. if 228.
70. Id. In most, if not all, cases whether the prosecution proves the mens rea element will depend
on the defendant's conduct because "[i]n practice, the significance of the accused's contribution will be
relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose."
Prosecutor v. Kovcka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment if 97 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Fonner
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.
pdf[hereinafter Kovcka Appeal Judgment].
71. Tadic Appeal Judgment if 228.
72. Compare Kovcka Appeal Judgment ii 86 ("A participant may be responsible for such crimes
only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional
crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him."), with Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case
No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ir 290 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Fonner
Yugoslavia June 16, 2004 ), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_ milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf
(stating that attribution is appropriate if"it was reasonably foreseeable to him" that other crimes would
be committed by a participant in the joint criminal enterprise).
73. Compare Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment if 150 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.
pdf ("[T]he accused participated in that enterprise aware of the probability that other crimes may
result."), with Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal ii 290 (stating that the crime charged must be a "possible consequence" of executing the
JCE).
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D. Risk and Mens Rea
The facts supporting the existence of, and Tadic's participation in, a
74
JCE were: (1) he was "an armed member of an armed group;" (2) the
armed group attacked the village of JaskiCi and Tadic "actively took part
in this attack, rounding up and severely beating some of the men;" 75
(3) the armed group was violent, beating some of the men from the village
"into insensibility[] as they lay on the road" 76 and threatening witnesses
with death as the men were being taken away; and (4) five men, who had
been alive, were found dead, after the armed group, including Tadic, had
left the village. 77 Based on this evidence the Appeals Chamber concluded:
[T]he only possible inference to be drawn is that the Appellant had
the intention to further the criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor
region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts
against them. That non-Serbs might be killed in the effecting of this
common aim was, in the circumstances of the present case,
foreseeable. The Appellant was aware that the actions of the group
of which he was a member were likely to lead to such killings, but
he nevertheless willingly took that risk. 78
In just this brief passage, the Appeals Chamber used two different terms
-"foreseeable" and "aware"-when describing the mens rea required to
prove participation in a JCE III. To further complicate the picture, in an
earlier portion of the opinion, the Court stated "everyone in the group must
have been able to predict this result." 79 As one post-Tadic Trial Chamber
observed, "[i]t is unfortunate that expressions conveying different shades
of meaning have been used ... apparently interchangeably." 80

74. Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 232.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. ii 181.
78. Id. ii 232.
79. Id. ii 220 (emphasis in the original). The Tadic Appeals Chamber described this state of mind
as do/us eventualis or advertent recklessness. Id. Advertent recklessness is recognized in English law.
See Stephen P. Garvey, What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85 TEX.L.REV. 333, 340 n.38
(2006).
80. Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further
Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ii 29 n.112 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 26 2001 ), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10626
FI2 I 5879.htm.
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Nonetheless, that same Trial Chamber concluded that the words
"predictable" and "foreseeable" are truly interchangeable in this context. 81
Both terms involve foretelling that a future event (consequence) will
happen. 82 Awareness, on the other hand, is equated with knowledge. 83 It
would seem to be epistemologically impossible to have actual knowledge
that conduct will bring about a particular result. The Lubanga Trial
Chamber recognized this impossibility when it observed that the "coperpetrators only 'know' the consequences of the conduct once they have
occurred."84 Thus, a certain amount of contingency as to the result is built
into whichever of the three terms is used, although arguably awareness
requires a higher degree of certainty than foreseeability or predictability. 85
It is important to note that the Tadic Appeals Chamber used these three
terms in different contexts. The murders of non-Serbs by members of the
ICE were a foreseeable consequence of the plan to ethnically cleanse the
villages by forcibly displacing the residents. 86 "Aware," on the other hand,
referred to the defendant's knowledge "that the actions of the group of
which he was a member were likely to lead to such killings. " 87
"Predictability," as it is used in Tadic, seems to quantify the likelihood
that the risk will materialize, which is very high indeed if "everyone in the
group" 88 must be able to predict the specific crime that will be
committed. 89
A source of disagreement among the post-Tadic Courts is whether the
foreseeability of the commission of a crime not within the common plan is
determined objectively (from a reasonable person's standpoint) or
subjectively (from the defendant's standpoint). 90 The language used by the
Tadic Appeals Chamber unequivocally adopts the subjective standard:

81. Id.
82. I THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1003 (Leslie Brown ed., 1993)
(defining foresee as "be aware of beforehand; predict"); 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1003 (Leslie Brown ed., 1993) (defining predict as "[a]nnounce as an event that will
happen in the future").
83. I THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 157 (Leslie Brown ed. 1993).
84. Lubanga Judgment i11012.
85. The Model Penal Code recognizes that absolute certainty is not required. It defines the
required level of certainty for "knowledge" as "practical certainty." The MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.20(2)(b)(ii) (I 985).
86. See Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 204. Indeed, in some of the cases relied upon by the Tadic
Court, the courts posited a causal relationship between the planned and unplanned crime. Id. ii 218.
87. Id. ii 232.
88. Id. ii 220.
89. Id. i1220.
90. The jurisprudence of the ICTY provides no clear guidance on this question. See Danner &
Martinez, supra note 5, at 106. The law in the United States is probably no better. See Note,
Developments in the law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 996 (1959).
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It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is
required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not
intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of
the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless
willingly that risk. 91

Nonetheless, some of the post-Tadic courts92 and, significantly, the late
Professor/Judge Antonio Cassese, who was on the panel that decided
Tadic, concluded that objective (reasonable person) foreseeability was the
standard. 93 The implications are quite significant, because if foreseeability
is objectively determined then the standard for attributing liability for the
most serious crimes is reduced to something akin to negligence. 94 Since
objective foreseeability demands only that a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have foreseen the risk that crimes beyond the
criminal purpose of the JCE were likely, then the defendant, even if she
was not actually aware, "should" have been aware of that risk as well. 95
Imposing liability for serious crimes based upon less than some form of
actual risk awareness would run afoul of the principle of culpability. 96
It is unclear how "reasonable foreseeability" found its way into the
post-Tadic case law. 97 The Tadic Court drew on a number of diverse
sources, including post-World War II British and U.S. war crimes cases, 98
World War II war crimes cases prosecuted in the Italian courts, 99
international treaties, 100 and national law cases from both civil and

91. Tadic Appeal Judgment i1220.
92. See, e.g., infra note 113 and cases cited therein.
93. Cassese, supra note 33, at 201; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese, 'ii
26, Prosecutor v. Kaing ("Duch"), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02) at 298-99.)
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia October 27, 2008) {"It would, however, also be
necessary for the 'secondary offender' ... to be in a position, under the man of reasonable prudence
test, to predict the rape.").
94. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5, at 108-09.
95. See Cassese, supra note 33, at 200-01 (arguing that this "lower threshold" of liability is
appropriate).
96. See Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 62 (citing Ambos, supra note 24, at 175).
97. The only support for this position in the Tadii: case itself comes from its citation of the
Pinkerton doctrine (United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)) which it said imputed criminal
responsibility "for acts committed in furtherance of a common criminal purpose, whether the acts are
explicitly planned or not, provided that such acts might have been reasonably contemplated as a
probable consequence or likely result of the common criminal purpose." Tadic Appeal Judgment,
'ii 224 n.289. All the other cases cited in Tadii: that specifically addressed the question required
subjective foreseeability. See e.g.. Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 224 nn.287, 288 and 290.
98. Id. 'il'il 205-15.
99. Id. il'il 214-19.
100. Id. 'il'il 221-23.
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common law countries. 101 From its survey of these sources, the Tadic
Court concluded that there was a "consistency and cogency of the case law
and the treaties" that supported the conclusion that JCE III was customary
international law. 102 It observed, however, that the "major legal systems of
the world [do not] take the same approach to this notion." 103 And, while
the mens rea "was not clearly spelled out" in those cases, a fair inference
was that they "required that the event must have been predictable." 104
Several paragraphs later, the Court was even more specific regarding what
level of foresight was required when it said, "everyone in the group must
have been able to predict the result." 105
By requiring that deviatory crimes be predictable to every member of
the JCE, the Appeals Chamber established a mens rea for attributing
liability via JCE III that substantially exceeds "mere foreseeability." 106
Former ICTY Judge Shahabuddeen, who also was on the panel that
decided Tadic, described the mens rea as exceeding awareness:
In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber did use the word 'aware' but its
judgment shows that it was speaking of more than awareness. It was
referring to a case in which the accused, when committing the
original crime, was able to 'predict' that a further crime would be
committed by his colleagues as the 'natural and foreseeable
consequence of the effecting of [the] common purpose' of the
parties ... and that he nevertheless 'willingly' took the 'risk' of that
further crime being committed. 107

Thus, JCE III liability occurs only when the risk of a crime outside the
common purpose was "a predictable consequence of the execution of the
common design." 108 Predictability or foreseeability, in tum, is directly
linked to the purpose of the JCE in which the defendant intentionally
participated. 109 This goes well beyond a general awareness that other

10 I. Id. ilil 224-25.
102. Id. ii 226.
103. Id. ii 225
104. Id. ii 218.
105. Id. ii 220 (emphasis in the original).
106. Ambos, supra note 24, at 172-73.
107. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ii 7 (Int'!
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004) (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
108. Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 204.
109. Some of the cases discussed in Tadic describe a causal relationship between the agreed upon
crime and the deviatory crime.
"'For there to be a relationship of material causality between the crime willed by one of the
participants and the different crime committed by another, it is necessary that the latter crime
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crimes might occur. Instead, it requires that the defendant be able to
predict a specific crime that actually did occur and that he "willingly" took
that risk. 110 Thus, in Tadic, murder was a predictable consequence of
ethnic cleansing by the commission of inhumane acts directed at the nonSerb population of Prijedor. 111
From the foregoing analysis, two points regarding the Tadic Appeals
Chamber's approach to risk are clear: (1) foreseeability requires
knowledge of the risk of commission of specific crimes that could have
been, but were not, part of the agreement or common plan, and (2) the test
is actual foreseeability (subjective) and not reasonable foreseeability
(objective). Unfortunately, not all the post-Tadic courts have seen it that
way, especially on the question of whether the assessment of risk
awareness is a subjective 112 or objective determination. 113
Another source of disagreement among the post-Tadic courts regards
the substantiality of the risk, i.e., how likely it is that the risk will

should constitute the logical and predictable development of the former."'
Tadic Appeal Judgment 'IJ 218 (quoting Mannelli, a decision of the Italian Court ofCassation, July 20,
1949).
110. See, e.g., Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, if 411 (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (stating that the deviatory crime was foreseeable "in order to carry out the
actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose"); Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case No.
IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 'II 292 (lnt'I Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 16, 2004) (observing it was foreseeable that genocide would be committed by other
participants in the JCE "as a consequence of the commission of those crimes [that were part of the
common plan]").
111. Tadic Appeal Judgment if 232.
I 12. See, e.g., Kovcka, Appeal Judgment ii 86 ("A participant may be responsible for such crimes
only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional
crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him."); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33A, Judgment, if 150 (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) (holding that "it is
sufficient that their occurrence [other criminal acts] was foreseeable to him"); Prosecutor v. Stakic,
Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 'II 65 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006)
("[T]he crime must be shown to have been foreseeable to the accused in particular.")
113. Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, 'IJ 290 (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004) (stating that attribution is
appropriate if "it was reasonably foreseeable to him" that other crimes would be committed by a
participant in the joint criminal enterprise); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, 'II 5 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acdec/en/040319.htm (stating that it is sufficient that it was
"reasonably foreseeable to the accused that the crime charged would be committed by other members
of the joint criminal enterprise"); A,,;icus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese, at 298-9926,
Prosecutor v. Kaing ("Duch"), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), (Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Oct. 27, 2008) ("It would, however, also be necessary for the
'secondary offender' ... to be in a position, under the man of reasonable prudence test, to predict the
rape.").
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materialize, because de minimus risks should not result in criminal
. hment. 114
pums
The Tadic Court set the risk level that deviant crimes will occur at
"most likely." 115 A subsequent ICTY Trial Chamber stated that "most
likely" means "probable (if not more)." 116 But, according to the Trial
Chamber, because Tadic said that its standard was the same as dolus
eventualis, that "would seem to reduce [the risk] ... to a possibility." 117 It
is not at all clear why the Trial Chamber opted for "possibility,'' especially
since it acknowledged that there are stronger and weaker versions of dolus
eventualis. 118 Moreover, Professor Cassese observed that a "good
definition" of dolus eventualis is found in the New York Penal Law,
inspired by the Model Penal Code, which requires that the defendant is
"aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that such result will occur." 119 The drafters of the Model Penal Code
described recklessness as an "awareness ... of risk, that is of a probability
less than substantial certainty." 120 The risk is substantial and unjustifiable
if consciously disregarding it is a "gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor's situation would
observe." 121 Thus, the Model Penal Code defines recklessness "in terms of
both greater risk and subjective awareness." 122
Tadic is essentially consistent with this approach. The deviant crime
must be related closely enough to the common plan that the risk of its
occurrence is a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of carrying out the
common plan (substantial risk). The specific deviant crime that occurs
must have been predictable to every member of the JCE (actual

114. David M. Treiman, infra note 121, at 337-38.
115. Tadic Appeal Judgment i1220.
116. Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talic Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further
Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ii 29 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 26, 2001).
117. Id.
118. Id. if 29 n.112. ("The extent to which the possibility must be perceived differs according to
the particular country in which the civil law is adopted, but the highest would appear to be that there
must be a "concrete" basis for supposing that the particular consequence will follow."); see also Kai
Ambos, Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 715, 718
(2009) ("In this regard one must not overlook the fact that the 'commonly agreed' standard [for dolus
eventualis] invoked by the Chamber is by no means the only one.").
119. Cassese, supra note 33, at 67 n.21 (quoting N.Y. PENAL CODE§ 15.05(3)); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE§ 2.02 (2)(c) (1985).
120. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 cmt. 3(1985).
121. Id.; David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 337
(1981 ).
122. Wayne R. Lafave, CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.4 (b), 282-83 n.26 (5th ed. 2010).
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awareness). And, finally, the defendant must willingly take the risk
(conscious risk taking). 123
Nonetheless, the post-Tadic ICTY cases are in disarray. 124 Little
wonder, then, that Tadic has been criticized for its inherent instability and
.
.
ten dency to pro duce mcons1stent
resu1ts. 125
III. FROM THE ICTY TO THE ICC
As the caseload at the ICC began to ramp up, it was apparent that the
ICTY's approach to recklessness approach lacked clarity. 126 Tadic 's
formulation (some say creation) of JCE III had been widely criticized. 127
There was disagreement whether the mens rea for JCE III was objective or
subjective and the ICTY had adopted no clear standard for risk
quantification. 128 Moreover, neither the language nor the drafting history
of Article 30 suggested that it embraced recklessness. 129 It was, therefore,
somewhat surprising that in the first opinion dealing with the subject, ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that Article 30 "also encompasses other

123. See supra pp. 687-88.
124. Compare Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment i! 150 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) ("[T]he accused participated in that enterprise aware of the
probability that other crimes may result."); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, ii 5 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19 2004) (stating that JCE
Ill liability for deviant crimes is established if the accused participated in the enterprise "with the
awareness that the commission of that agreed upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable to him that
the crime charged would be committed") with Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision
on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ii 290 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16,
2004) (stating that the crime charged must be a "possible consequence" of executing the JCE);
Prosecuctor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment ii 587 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (equating dolus eventualis to the U.S. concept of reckless or "depraved
heart" murder and observing that "if the killing is committed with 'manifest indifference to the value
of human life', even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide."). See also
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01105-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber 11, Decision Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, ii 363 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Bemba Decision].
125. See Harmen van der Wilt, Guilty by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise on Trial, 5 J.
INT'L. CRIM. L. 91, 101 (2006).
126. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
128. Seesupranotes 112, 113, 124,and 125 and accompanying text.
129. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 205 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999).
There was agreement that, in principle, all the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
would require intent and knowledge unless specifically provided otherwise. After it was
pointed out that the word recklessness did not appear anywhere in the definitions of crimes, it
was agreed that a definition of that concept was unnecessary. The article was then adopted.
See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
86-87 (2001 ).
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forms of the concept of do/us [eventualis] which have already been
resorted to by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals." 130 Some scholars
endorsed the opinion; 131 others did not. 132
Two years later, in the Bemba decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II reached
the opposite conclusion. 133 The Pre-Trial Chamber looked to the language
of Article 30 that requires at minimum, "[ u]nless otherwise specified," that
a defendant have an "awareness that ... a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events." 134The Pre-trial Chamber concluded that this
language "does not accommodate a lower standard than the one required
by do/us directus in the second degree (oblique intention)." 135 Later on,
after observing that Article 30 requires that the "occurrence is close to
certainty," the Pre-Trial Chamber opined that "[t]his standard is
undoubtedly higher than the principal standard commonly agreed upon for
do/us eventualis-namely, foreseeing the occurrence of the undesired
consequences as a mere likelihood or possibility." 136 Bemba too had its
detractors 137 and supporters. 138
Thus, the issue was joined and awaited (at least temporary) resolution
in the ICC's first Trial Chamber decision.

130. PTC Decision ii 352 (citing the Tadic Appeal Judgment ii 219 and the Stakic Trial Judgment

iJ 587).
131. Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake, and Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on
Confirmation of Charges, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 471, 484 (2008) (approving the Pre-Trial Chamber's
inclusion of a strong form of do/us eventualis as consistent with Article 30).
132. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693,
724 (2011) (observing that "it is not at all clear" that do/us eventualis satisfies the requirements of
Article 30).
133. Bemba Decision ii 360.
134. Rome Statute, art. 30 (I), (2)(b),(3).
135. Bemba Decision ii 360. The Pre-Trial Chamber defined do/us directus in the second degree
as:
Do/us Directus in the second degree does not require that the suspect has the actual intent or
will to bring about the material elements of the crime, but that he or she is aware that those
elements will be the almost inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions, i.e., the suspect 'is
aware that [... ] [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events' (article
30(2)(b) of the Statute).
Id. iJ 359.
136. Id. iJiJ 362-63.
137. Kai Ambos, Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 715,
718 (2009) ("In this regard one must not overlook the fact that the 'commonly agreed' standard
invoked by the Chamber is by no means the only one. In fact, there are other, more cognitive concepts
of do/us eventualis (requiring awareness or certainty as to a consequence) and these may indeed be
included in Article 30.")
138. Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 104 AM. J. lNT'L L. 241
(2010).
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A. Lubanga
In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the Trial Chamber defined co-perpetration

in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as including a risk-taking
element. 139 It held that committing a crime jointly with another or through
another person provided for liability based on co-perpetration. 14 Coperpetration, in turn, requires adherence by the defendant to an agreement
or common plan ... The plan can, but need not, be "intrinsically
criminal," so long as it includes "a critical element of criminality." 141 The
"critical element of criminality" has both an objective and subjective
element. The objective element is satisfied if the "implementation [of the
plan] embodies a sufficient risk that, in the ordinary course of events, a
crime will be committed." 142 The subjective element, found in Article
30(3), is satisfied if the "co-perpetrators are aware of the risk that the
consequence, prospectively, will occur." 143
In addition to agreeing to the common plan and being aware of its risk
of criminality, the defendant must make an "essential contribution" to its
implementation. 144 Whether the contribution is essential "is to be based on
an analysis of the common plan and the role that was assigned to, or was
assumed by the co-perpetrator, according to the division of tasks." 145
Moreover, there must be proof that the defendant "was aware that he
provided an essential contribution to the implementation of the common
plan." 146 Finally, the crime must be "the result of the combined and
coordinated contributions of those involved, or at least two of them." 147
As to the mens rea, the Trial Chamber's opinion is hardly a model of
clarity. Having predicated liability on a plan that presented a risk that a
certain result would occur, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that at the
time the plan was formed, at best, the co-perpetrators could only have an

°

139. Lubanga Judgment ~ii 985-86.
140. id. ii 980.
141. id. ii 984.
142. id. ii 987.
143. id. ii 986.
144. Lubanga Judgment ii 999. The Trial Chamber thus rejected both the Pre-Trial Chamber's
conclusion, urged by the defense, that the defendant's role had to be a conditio sine qua non of the
crime; that is, that the failure of the defendant to perform the tasks assigned to him would frustrate the
plan. It also rejected the prosecutor's argument that the defendant's contribution need only be
"substantial." id. ilil 989-92.
145. id. i11000.
146. Id. ii 1013.
147. Id.~ 994.
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awareness of a contingent result, even as to the crimes they had agreed
upon, until those crimes were committed. 148
Article 30 of the Rome Statute sets out the mental element that must be
proved in order for a defendant to be held criminally responsible for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. "Unless otherwise provided,"
the prosecution must prove "intent and knowledge" as to each material
element. 149 Similar to the approach taken in the Model Penal Code,
different mental states relate to different material elements. 150 As to a
conduct element, the person must act with intent; that is, the "person
means to engage in the conduct." 151 As to the result or consequence, the
defendant may either intend to cause the consequence or be aware (know)
that the consequence "will occur in the ordinary course of events." 152
From the language in Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, the Trial
Chamber concluded that co-perpetration requires an "awareness" of the
risk that a consequence of the agreement or common plan "will occur in
the ordinary course of events." 153 The Trial Chamber, however, rejected
the Pre-Trial Chamber's conclusion that Article 30 encompasses dolus
eventualis, 154 because the drafting history of the Rome Statute "suggests"
that this form of mens rea was not included in Article 30. 155 According to
the Trial Chamber, the distinction between the knowledge required by
Article 30 and dolus eventualis is that Article 30 requires awareness that
consequences "will occur," while dolus eventualis requires only awareness
that the consequences "may occur." 156
Despite the Trial Chamber's insistence that its approach to the mens
rea required for the "risk" element of co-perpetration is different from the
Pre-Trial Chamber's, on closer examination, their differences appear to be
more a matter of labeling than substance. 157 The Pre-Trial Chamber
identified two forms of do/us eventualis: substantial risk and low risk. It
defined the objective element of substantial risk as a likelihood that that

148. Id. i11012 ("The co-perpetrators only 'know' the consequences of the conduct once they have
occurred.").
149. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1).
150. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1), (2), (3), with MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2) (1985).
151. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(2)(a).
152. Id. art. 30(2)(b ).
153. Lubanga Judgment '1!'111011-12.
154. Lubanga PTC Decision ii 355.
155. Lubanga Judgment '1! 1011.
156. Id.
157. PTC Decision '1!'11352-54.
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the risk "will occur in the ordinary course of events." 158 In substantial risk
situations, the defendant's mens rea is established by proof that she was
aware of the substantial likelihood that her actions "would result" in the
commission of a crime and her decision to act "despite such awareness." 159
In low risk situations the defendant "must have clearly or expressly
accepted the idea" that the crime "may" occur. 160
In substantial risk situations, there is little, if any, practical distinction
between the language used by the Pre-Trial Chamber and that used by the
Trial Chamber. At one point the Trial Chamber defines knowledge of a
future event, per Article 30(3), as "awareness by the co-perpetrators that a
consequence will occur (in the future), [which] necessarily means that the
co-perpetrators are aware of the risk that the consequences, prospectively,
will occur." 161 Later on, it stated its view that awareness of a future
consequence "means that the participants anticipate, based on their
knowledge of how events ordinarily develop, that the consequence will
occur in the future." 162 And finally, the Trial Chamber found that when the
co-perpetrators agree on the common plan, they "must know [of] the
existence of a risk that the consequence will occur" and the "degree of the
risk ... must be no less than awareness on the part of the co-perpetrator
that the consequence 'will occur in the ordinary course of events.' A low
risk will not be sufficient." 163
What does this mean other than that the risk of the commission of a
crime must have been substantial at the time the defendants entered into
the common plan? 164 Moreover, this approach is practically the same as
that of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 165 In substantial risk cases, the Pre-Trial
Chamber characterized the requisite level of awareness as "the substantial
likelihood that his or her actions or omissions would result in the
realisation of the objective elements of the crime." 166 Thus, at least in the
substantial risk cases, there appears to be no significant difference in the

158. Id. ii 353.
159. Id.
160. Id. ii 354. 1 agree with Professor Weigand that the Pre-Trial Chamber's formulation of low
risk do/us eventualis, if that form exists, would not satisfy Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute.
Weigand, supra note 131, at 484.
161. Lubanga Judgment iJ 986.
162. Id. ii 1012.
163. Id.
164. See Weigand, supra note 131, at 482.
165. The Pre-Trial Chamber did not say, as the Trial Chamber implied, that it is sufficient if such
awareness is that the consequence "may" result from the defendant's conduct. ... PTC Decision,
iJ 353.
166. Id.
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approaches to mens rea taken by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers and,
therefore, the observations of one commentator regarding the Pre-Trial
Chamber's opinion are equally applicable to the Trial Chamber's opinion:
Criminal lawyers from common law jurisdictions would hardly
describe this mental requirement as anything close to intentional or
purposeful. At most, it is a form of advertent recklessness. Criminal
lawyers from civil law jurisdictions will often refer to this mental
element as dolus eventualis and consider it uncontroversial, but the
ICC's use of the concept here bears scrutiny. 167
If this observation is correct, and I think it is, then the very same questions
about the mens rea for attributing liability that have plagued the ICTY
have already surfaced in the ICC. 168 Three ICC cases (all decided before
the Lubanga Trial Chamber decision) suggest that the ICC, so far, is no
better than the ICTY in its approach to risk analysis.

B. Bemba
Jean-Pierre Bemba was the president of the Mouvement de Liberation
du Congo (MLC) and commander of its military arm, the Armee. de
Liberation du Congo (ALC). 169 The MLC was based in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). 170 Bemba ordered MLC troops sent to the aid
of Patasse, the democratically elected president of the Central African
Republic (CAR). 171 According to witness testimony credited by the PreTrial Chamber, Bemba's instructions to the MLC troops were to
"'destabilize all the enemies' coming from the DRC" and "defend the
president [Patasse]." 172 Based on this evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber
could not conclude that "Bemba was aware that, in the ordinary cours·e of
events, the commission of rape would be the virtually certain consequence
of his action." 173

167. Ohlin, supra note 23, at 723-24.
168. In this regard, it is important to note that the Lubanga Trial Chamber was dealing only with
the issue of mens rea for crimes that were part of the agreement or common plan. Lubanga Judgment,
ii 1. In fact, illegally enlisting child soldiers was the only international crime charged in furtherance of
the common plan "to ensure that the UPC/FPLC had an army strong enough to achieve its political and
military aims." Id ii 1347.
169. Bemba Decision if 455.
170. Id. iJ 99.
171. id. iJ 392.
172. Id.
173. Id iJ 396.
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Nor could it find that evidence that Patasse was informed that crimes
had been committed by Bemba's troops, coupled with evidence showing
frequent communications between Patasse and Bemba, was sufficient to
174
prove that Bemba learned about the commission of crimes from Patasse.
Finally, the prosecution argued that Bemba's mens rea was established by
his continued implementation of the common plan despite evidence that:
(1) media had broadcast that the MLC had committed crimes in the CAR;
(2) the MLC had informed Bemba of the commission of crimes in the
CAR; and (3) Bemba had acknowledged the commission of these crimes
himself. 175
The Pre-Trial Chamber, nonetheless, rejected the prosecution's
argument that this evidence satisfied Article 30 stating:
In particular, the Chamber cannot infer that he was aware that by

keeping his troops in the CAR, it was a virtually certain
consequence that these crimes would be committed in the ordinary
course of events. As the Disclosed Evidence indicates, the most that
can be inferred is that Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba may have foreseen
the risk of occurrence of such crimes as a mere possibility and
accepted it for the sake of achieving his ultimate goal-that is, to
help Mr. Patasse retain power. In the Chamber's opinion, this does
not meet the required standard for article 30 of the Statute-namely,
do/us directus in the second degree. 176
C. Banda and Jerbo

In this case, the ICC prosecutor charged the defendants with organizing
and commanding an armed attack against a compound of UN
peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. 177 The Pre-Trial Chamber found
substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendants ordered the
attack, personally participated in it, led their troops during the attack and
therefore "meant to engage in the attack." 178 In these circumstances, the
Pre-Trial Chamber had little difficulty concluding that, although there was

174. Id. ii 397.
175. Id. ii 398.
176. Id. ii 400.
177. Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the "Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges" i1ii 4-5 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Banda]. They were charged with
violence to life and attempted violence to life under the Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 8(2)(c)(i),
25(3)(a) and 25(3)(t), intentionally attacking a peacekeeping mission under arts. 8(2)(e)(iii), and
25(3)(a) and pillaging under arts. 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(a). /d. ii 5.
178. Id. ii 153.
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no substantial evidence that the defendants "specifically meant to cause
killings of protected AMIS personnel as a consequence of the attack," 179
they still knew that killings would occur: "The fact of orchestrating an
attack by numerous and heavily armed troops on a relatively small
peacekeeping mission itself implies the virtual certainty that killings
would ensue, a certainty which is consistent with the subjective element as
defined in article 30 of the Statute." 180
D. Kenyatta and Hussein
In this case, the ICC prosecutor charged the defendants with entering
into a common plan to keep the Kenyan pro-Party of National Unity
(PNU) 181 in power by "every means necessary," including "orchestrating a
police failure to prevent the commission of crimes," committing
widespread and systematic attacks against their political opponents, and
deliberately failing to stop retaliatory attacks. 182 To carry out the plan,
Kenyatta mediated between the PNU and a criminal organization, the
Mungiki, to obtain the support of the latter for the PNU. 183 After the
election, the defendants used the Mungiki to carry out retaliatory attacks
against the political opposition in the Rift Valley in order to "strengthen
the PNU's hold on power. ... " 184 In the course of carrying out the plan,
some of the Mungiki raped civilian residents of Nakuru and Naivasha. 185
Although there was no indication that rape was an intended crime, the
defendants had directed the Mungiki to take revenge against civilians "in
the knowledge of and exploiting the ethnic hatred of the attackers towards
their victims." 186 Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the
defendants "knew that rape was a virtually certain consequence of the
implementation of the common plan." 187
-

179. Id i1155.
180. Id ii 156.
181. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-0 I /09-02/11 Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ii 102 (Jan. 23,
2012) [hereinafter Kenyata].
182. Id. i1288.
183. Id. ii 289.
184. Id ii 290.
185. Id.,1415.
186. Id.
187. Id
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E. Observations

Perhaps the most striking thing about Banda and Kenyatta is their
188
failure even to refer to risk. Both are cases of co-perpetration.
Moreover, unlike Lubanga, these cases dealt with deviant crimes; that is,
crimes that were not a part of the common plan. 189 Given the fact that both
cases involved liability for crimes directly committed by others that were
not part of the plan, those crimes were, at best, a risk at the time the
190
defendants entered into the plans. Yet, neither court mentioned risk.
Instead both saw the mens rea as a straightforward application of Article
30(2)(b). 191
Almost certainly, the Lubanga Trial Chamber decision would change
the approach in these two cases to one involving risk analysis. Lubanga's
approach to co-perpetration applies in any case where the crime was
committed by two or more persons. 192 In such situations the result, in so
far as any individual defendant is concerned, is contingent; i.e., "a
sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be
committed." 193 The Lubanga Trial Chamber found that was so even where
the crime committed was part of the common plan. 194 It is even more so in
cases like Banda and Kenyatta where deviant crimes are involved. If the
crime was not part of the plan, how could its future occurrence be anything
more than a risk?
Bemba, on the other hand, shows just how hard it can be to find a
defendant guilty if a court applies Article 30 literally. Put another way,
absent a more flexible approach to attribution of liability, there will be
impunity for defendants like Bemba who almost certainly must have
known his troops were committing rape in the CAR. Bemba is a good
illustration of the point made by an author who conducted an extensive
study ofICTR Trial Chamber decisions:
The fact-finding challenges identified in the foregoing chapters
should cause us to question whether in fact we could use traditional
doctrines of criminal liability in a great number of international

188. See Banda, iJ 151; Kenyatta, ii 287.
189. Neither the killings in Banda nor the rapes in Kenyatta were part of the criminal plan. Id.
190. The Banda Pre-Trial Chamber cited the PTC Decision in Lubanga but did not mention that
that court had concluded that Article 30 encompassed do/us eventua/is. Banda, iJ 150 n.259.
191. Kenyatta, iJ 415; Banda, ii 156. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 30(2)(b) (The "person is
... aware that [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events.").
192. Lubanga Judgment, iiii 980-981.
193. Id.ii984.
194. Id. iiii 984-987.
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criminal cases. No one would deny that it is better to ground
criminal convictions on reliable evidence of the defendant's
personal commission of criminal acts or omissions. But if such
evidence does not exist in the vast run of cases, and if we have not
decided to abandon international trials altogether, then it may be
more normatively justified to respond to those evidentiary
deficiencies by candidly expanding criminal liability doctrines than
by ignoring those deficiencies and purporting to base convictions on
traditional doctrines. 195
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Risk is baked into co-perpetration. 196 The ICC therefore must develop a
consistent approach to risk analysis. Thus far, however, the debate has
largely been about whether Article 30 of the Rome Statute includes JCE
III (do/us eventualis). This is a sterile exercise which distracts from the
real work of developing standards that courts can apply uniformly in order
to achieve consistent results, a task at which the ICTY failed. The JCE III
debate inevitably dredges up this unfortunate history, which the ICC quite
rightly should try to avoid repeating.
Based on the cases it has decided so far, it does not appear that the ICC
will be any more systematic in its approach to risk analysis than the ICTY
was. Nonetheless, one issue that troubled the ICTY does not appear to
present a problem for the ICC. The language of Article 30 197 seems to
preclude the argument that risk awareness is assessed from an objective
"reasonable person" perspective, and none of the cases has even
considered that argument. 198
The question of risk quantification is far less clear. Thus far, only the
Lubanga Trial Chamber has squarely addressed this issue and it failed to
define what degree of risk is necessary in order for criminal liability to
attach. Instead, it approached the question from the opposite direction
when it stated that a co-perpetrator's awareness of a "low risk will not be

195.

NANCY

AMOURY

COMBS,

FACT-FINDING

WITHOUT

FACTS:

THE

UNCERTAIN

EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 333 (2010).
196. See Neha Jain, supra note I, at 170 ("[D]eviations from the common plan that are

within the
range ofrelevant acts with which one must nonnally reckon do not count as an excess. The main test is
the foreseeability of the deviant course of action.").
197. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(3) ("For the purposes of this article, 'knowledge' means
awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.").
198. See e.g., Lubanga Judgment, ii 1012 ("At the time the co-perpetrators agree on a common
plan and throughout its implementation, they must know the existence of a risk that the consequence
will occur.").
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sufficient." 199 Clarifying the degree (substantiality) of the risk is critical
because "criminal liability ought to require more than an ordinary
deviation from a legal norm." 200 Quantifying the risk by stating what is not
sufficient gives other courts no guidance on what is sufficient.
The ICC has also failed to address the issue of risk certainty. On this
question, the cases have focused on the language of Articles 30 (2)(b) and
(3), providing that a consequence "will occur in the ordinary course of
events."201 The Lubanga Trial Chamber, grappling with this concept, used
several different terms conveying different shades of meaning:
[T]he "awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary
course of events" means that the participants anticipate, based on
their knowledge of how events ordinarily develop, that the
consequence will occur in the future. This prognosis involves
consideration of the concepts of "possibility" and "probability,"
which are inherent to the notions of "risk" and "danger." Risk is
defined as "danger, (exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury or
other adverse circumstance."202
So must the risk be a "possibility" ("something that may exist or
happen") 203 or a "probability" ("a thing judged likely to be true, to exist, or
to happen")? 204 While it is true that these are closely related concepts,
"probability" suggests a somewhat higher degree of certainty. It is
significant, therefore, that the Trial Chamber used "possibility" when it
defined risk, apparently opting for the lower standard.
More importantly, how does this language square with that used by the
Trial Chamber in the preceding paragraph of its opinion when it rejected
the proposition that do/us eventualis was included in Article 30 because
"[t]he plain language of the Statute, and most particularly the use of the
words 'will occur' in Article 30(2)(b) as opposed to 'may occur,' excludes
the concept of do/us eventualis." 205 If risk is by definition a "possible"
consequence, how can a defendant ever be aware that it "will" occur?
The Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber had a slightly different take on the
phrase: "will occur in the ordinary course of events."206 It opined that this

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Lubanga Judgment, i11012.
Treiman, supra note 121, at 337.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 30(2)(b) and (3).
Lubanaga Judgment, ii 1012.
2 THE NEW OXFORD SHORTER DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 2302.
Id. at 2362.
Lubanga Judgment i110 I I.

Id.
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phrase "clearly indicate[ s] that the required standard of occurrence is close
to certainty." 207 Thus, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Article 30
requires a "virtual" or "practical" certainty that the "consequence will
follow, barring an unforeseen or unexpected intervention that prevent [sic]
its occurrence."208 The problem with this approach, as I argued above, is
that it is unlikely that any case involving risk could ever satisfy a "virtual"
or "practical" certainty standard. 209
Thus, imprecise use of language and the failure to quantify riskprecisely the same problems that vexed the ICTY-have already surfaced
in the ICC. The ICC should look to a new source for inspiration-the U.S.
Model Penal Code (MPC). 210 The drafters of the MPC directly confronted
the challenge of systematizing an approach to the mental element of
crime.2" Its approach to recklessness, while having similarities to ICE III,
is a substantial improvement over it.
One of the MPC's greatest contributions to the development of
criminal law is its articulation of a definition for recklessness, which
guides courts in distinguishing between criminal and non-criminal
conduct. 212 In that regard, the MPC sets out distinctive criteria to ensure
that a defendant who engages in risky conduct is sufficiently culpable to
warrant criminal punishment. 213 The first requirement is "conscious risk
creation."214 This means actual awareness (knowledge) of a risk. 215 The
risk must be both "substantial" and "unjustifiable."216 The MPC does not
define "substantial," but the Commentary characterizes the risk of which
the defendant is aware as "a probability less than substantial certainty." 217
In other words, whether the risk will materialize is "something less than
100% certainty" from the defendant's perspective at the time she engages

207. Bemba Decision, supra note 125, iJ 362.
208. Id.
209. Perhaps that is why the Lubanga Trial Chamber seemed to contradict itself when it followed
Bemba 's rejection of do/us eventualis and then in the next paragraph defined risk in terms of
"possibility" and "probability," rather than virtual certainty.
210. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40.
211. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 1. The commentary quotes Justice Jackson, who in United States v.
Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952), wrote: 'The unanimity with which [the courts] have adhered to
the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety,
disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element."
212. See Treiman, supra note 121, at 284-85.
213. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02 cmt. 3. ("[T]he jury is to make the culpability
judgment in terms of whether the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk justifies condemnation.").
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.; See also Treiman, supra note 121, at 299.
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in the conduct. 218 The MPC thus requires knowledge of the risk but
somewhat less than knowledge that the result will occur. Nonetheless, the
gap between the two is razor thin. 219
The early ICC cases, like Bemba, seem to focus on how certain a
defendant is that a particular risk will occur in order to distinguish a mens
rea that is sufficient for criminal liability (knowledge) from one that it is
not (dolus eventualis). 220 Interestingly, however, the highest form of
221
culpability, "intent," requires no level of risk awareness at all.
According to the Rome Statute, a person intends a consequence if she
"means to cause that consequence."222 This approach is substantially the
same as that taken by the MPC, which uses the term "purposely" instead
of intent, and provides that one acts purposely with regard to a result when
it is "his conscious object ... to cause such a result." 223 This does not
require any degree of knowledge or awareness that the result will occur. 224
So, at least in this respect, recklessness includes an additional mens rea
element and thus may be even more difficult to prove than intent.
Beyond actual risk awareness, the MPC also makes it clear that some
risks, although substantial and foreseen, are justifiable; they are risks
worth taking. 225 Comments to an earlier draft of the MPC set out the

218. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 72 (2002).
219. For example, the MPC provides that in cases of "willful blindness," when knowledge of the
existence of a fact is required, it may be proved "if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist." Model Penal Code, supra note 40, §
2.02(7); see also Id. at cmt. 9. The commentary acknowledges that whether a defendant acts recklessly
or knowingly when he is aware of "the probable existence of a material fact" but ignores it, "presents a
subtle but important question." Id. at cmt. 9. The commentary draws a distinction, however, between
facts where "knowledge" is required and the results of conduct where recklessness is sufficient
because the latter "is necessarily a matter of the future at the time of acting." Id.; See also Wayne R.
LaFave, Criminal Law 262 (5th ed. 2010) (stating that the purposely and knowledge provisions of the
MPC "contemplate that one knows of present (as opposed to future) events only ifhe is actually aware
of them").
220. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
221. Dubber, supra note 218, at 72-73.
222. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(2)(b).
223. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2. 02(a)(i). See Kai Ambos, Critical Issues in the
Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 118, at 717 (The drafters of the Rome Statute used § 2.02 of
the MPC, relating to the distinction between purpose and knowledge, as "a reference for the ICC
Statute in many regards.").
224. Lafave, supra note 122, at 261 n.14 and accompanying text.
225. The example given in the commentary is the surgeon who performs a highly risky operation
because there is no other way to save the patient's life. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02
cmt.3.
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factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether the risk is
substantial and unjustifiable:
Accordingly to aid the ultimate determination, the draft points
expressly to the factors to be weighed in [the] judgment: the nature
and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him in
acting. 226
Requiring that the defendant is aware that the risk her conduct creates is
both "substantial" and "unjustifiable" is "useful" but still not "sufficient"
to establish criminal culpability because "[ s]ome standard is needed for
determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must be."227
Thus, the MPC adds two additional requirements. The subjective element
is that the defendant must "consciously disregard" the risk. 228 The
objective element is that disregarding the risk "involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation." 229 The "gross deviation" standard requires the fact
finder to determine that "the defendant's conduct involved 'culpability of
high degree. "'230
The MPC thus gives significantly more guidance to courts than any of
the standards thus far articulated by the ICTY or the ICC. It especially
focuses on risk quantification, and, as a result, it blunts the criticism
leveled at JCE III-that it attributes liability in cases where culpability is
lacking. 231 The question remains, however, whether the ICC could adopt
an MPC-like approach that would be consistent with the language in
Article 30 of the Rome Statute.

226. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt 3, at 125 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). The concept of
justifiable risks and assessing whether they are worth taking is already a feature of international
criminal law. For example, a commander may order an attack that will cause civilian casualties, so
long as it is justified by military necessity. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
art. 57, June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
227. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02 cmt. 3.
228. Id. § 2.02(222)(c). Conscious disregard of the risk implies an acceptance of the consequences
and therefore aligns the MPC with the German theory of do/us eventualis, which is sufficient to
establish criminal intent. See Dubber, supra note 218, at 74-76.
229. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02(2)(c).
230. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 216, § 2.02, cmt. at 125 (Tent. Draft 4 1955).
231. See, e.g., John Laugh land, Conspiracy, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility in International Criminal law 3 (Nov. 14, 2009), available at http://www.heritage
tpirdefense.org/papers/John _laugh land_Conspiracy_joint_criminal_enterprise_ and_command_respons
ibility.pdf.
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The potential sticking point is Article 30's requirement of knowledge
in relation to consequence. It defines knowledge as "awareness that a
circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events."232 Some of the ICC cases discussed above differentiated this
standard from dolus eventualis because it requires only awareness that the
result "may" occur, while Article 30 stipulates that there must be
awareness that it "will" occur. 233 If this approach is followed, then nothing
short of virtual certainty that a risk will materialize will support a finding
of guilt.
Yet, "awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events" must mean something different than "awareness that a
circumstance exists." Otherwise Article 30 would have said, "awareness of
a consequence or that a circumstance exists." A logical conclusion that
can be drawn from the distinction Article 30 makes between the two
situations is that knowledge that a fact exists requires a higher degree of
certainty ("practical" or "virtual") than knowledge that a particular result
"will occur in the ordinary course of events" (contingent or risk
awareness). 234
Thus, the concept that criminal liability may be based on a mens rea of
less than actual knowledge is arguably built into Article 30. If that premise
is correct, then so long as the defendant is actually aware of the risk and
consciously decides to take it, her mens rea need not also include an
element of certainty that the risk will come to pass. 235 By this view, the
key to criminal culpability is risk awareness. And, it is plausible to read
the language of Article 30 as requiring an "awareness that the risk will
occur in the ordinary course of events." Since the risk is now the
"consequence," that interpretation would be consistent with the language
of Article 30.
I have argued in this paper that the ICC should interpret Article 30 to
include the safeguards provided in the MPC for affixing liability for risky
conduct. Based on the few cases decided thus far, it already appears that
this will be a recurring issue. Eventually, the Court will have to face the
question squarely, and when it does, it either will incorporate some form

232. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(3).
233. See, e.g., supra pp. 696--97.
234. The difference between knowledge and recklessness comes down to a difference in
probabilities. Treiman, supra note 121, at 317.
235. Seevan der Vyver, supra note 138, at 245-46 ("If the intervening act or occurrence was
'unforeseen' or 'unexpected,' it would not have been within the perpetrator's contemplation and could
therefore not affect the measure of certainty entertained by him or her that the proscribed consequence
'will occur.'").
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of recklessness into the Rome Statute, or it will allow political or military
leaders to evade punishment for serious international crimes. The result of
the latter course would be impunity for those most responsible, which
would mean that the Court has failed to carry out one of its central
m1ss1ons.

